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MIRAGE IN THE GULF?: EXAMINING THE UPSURGE IN FDI 
IN THE GCC AND ITS LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MENA REGION 
Jordan E. Toone∗ 
Between 2002 and 2010, foreign direct investment (“FDI”) exploded in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”). Between 2002 and 2008 alone, FDI in 
the GCC increased over 3800%, outpacing both the developed and developing 
world by a significant margin. Although recent data suggests that FDI has 
declined in the GCC since 2010, scholars have yet to proffer nuanced analyses 
of the upsurge in FDI between 2002 and 2010. In general, the literature has 
not adequately examined the relatively dramatic increase in FDI in the GCC 
insofar as it has focused on pre-2002 data, failed to distinguish between FDI 
trends in the GCC and those in the wider Middle East and North Africa 
(“MENA”) region, ascribed the increased levels of FDI in the GCC solely to 
the rise in the price of crude oil, or examined post-2002 increases and 
decreases in FDI within unrepresentative contexts. More importantly, scholars 
have yet to examine whether the increase in FDI has facilitated economic 
growth in the GCC since 2002. 
Relying on information from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, the World Bank, and, where available, GCC countries 
themselves, this Article introduces statistical evidence into the scholarly debate 
on FDI in the GCC and the broader MENA region, revealing the dramatic 
upsurge in FDI in the GCC between 2002 and 2010 in comparison to global 
and regional trends. This Article also examines the general legal frameworks 
governing FDI regimes in the GCC, demonstrating the unique manner in 
which GCC states have implemented liberal macroeconomic policies while 
simultaneously maintaining regulatory control over strategic elements of their 
FDI regimes. Finally, this Article contributes to the ongoing scholarly debate 
surrounding the relationship between FDI and economic growth by examining 
the impact that the increased levels of FDI have had on economic growth in 
 
 ∗ Associate at White & Case LLP. I would like to thank Antony Anghie for his insightful comments. I 
am also indebted to the faculty and staff affiliated with the Visiting Researcher Program at Yale Law School 
for kindly providing the much needed time and resources necessary to revise this Article. In addition, I am 
especially grateful to Lindsay Toone, whose counsel and encouragement facilitated the research, writing, and 
editing of this Article. I alone am responsible for all errors herein. 
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GCC economies. Based on the available data, the statistical correlation 
between the dramatic increases in FDI and short-term economic growth in the 
GCC is minimal. The data suggests a stronger link between FDI and long-term 
economic growth in the GCC, although a definitive assessment requires a 
more nuanced statistical analysis. Thus, even if FDI levels had not declined 
after 2010, the data suggests that GCC states—and, by implication, other 
MENA states—ought to exercise restraint in assuming that increased levels of 
FDI translate into increased economic growth, at least in the short term. The 
findings herein are timely for other resource-rich, non-GCC states in the 
MENA region, particularly post-Arab spring democracies, as they reconsider 
traditional approaches to FDI in their efforts to foster economic development 
without surrendering regulatory control over strategic elements of state 
sovereignty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 2002 and 2010, the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”)1 
experienced a 2533% overall increase in inward foreign direct investment 
(“FDI”) flows, significantly outpacing global increases (108%) during the 
same period.2 Foreign stock investment3 flows into the GCC increased at high 
rates during this same period.4 Although recent data shows that FDI in the 
GCC has declined from its peak in 2008,5 there is not a substantial volume of 
scholarly research concerning the reasons behind either the increase in FDI in 
the GCC or its subsequent decline.6 The impact that these fluctuations—
particularly the increases—in FDI have had on economic development in the 
GCC since 2002 is an important question that this Article will examine. 
Relying on information from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (“UNCTAD”), the World Bank, and, where available, the GCC 
countries themselves, this Article adumbrates statistical evidence 
demonstrating the upsurge of FDI in the GCC, which, since 2002, has 
witnessed a yearly percentage increase in FDI that rivals any economic union, 
region, or individual state anywhere in the world. Even though FDI levels in 
the GCC began to decline in 2009, the dramatic increase in FDI in the GCC 
prior to 2009 provides scholars an excellent case study with which to examine 
the impact that FDI has on economic growth, thereby contributing to the 
 
 1 Also known as the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. See Cooperation Council for 
the Arab States Charter, May 25, 1981, 26 I.L.M. 1131 [hereinafter GCC Charter], available at http://www. 
gcc-sg.org/eng/indexfc7a.html. For a discussion of the GCC and its members, see infra Part II. 
 2 See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
Flows, Annual, 1970–2011, UNCTADSTAT (July 18, 2012), http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/ 
tableView.aspx?ReportId=88 [hereinafter UNCTAD, FDI Statistics]. 
 3 For definitions of “foreign investment” and “foreign stock investment,” see, respectively, infra notes 
36 and 73 and accompanying text. 
 4 See UNCTAD, Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment Stock, Annual, 1980–2011, 
UNCTADSTAT (July 18, 2012), http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=89 
[hereinafter UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics]. 
 5 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2 (showing that in 2009, 2010, and 2011, FDI in the GCC has 
declined from its peak in 2008); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, at 48–50, U.N. Sales No. 
E.12.II.D.3 (2012), [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012] available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/ 
files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf.  
 6 For an example of scholarship relating to FDI in the GCC, see Wasseem Mina, Do Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Encourage FDI in the GCC Countries?, 2 AFR. REV. ECON. & FIN. 1 (2010), available at 
http://african-review.com/Vol.%202%20(1)/Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaties%20and%20FDI.pdf. In 2012 
UNCTAD suggested the decline in FDI could be attributed in part to the fact that GCC countries were still 
recovering from the cancellation of large-scale projects in the wake of the global financial crisis. WORLD 
INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 5, at 49. 
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ongoing scholarly debate over the relationship between FDI and both short-
term and long-term economic growth.7 
Following a brief overview in Part I of the literature surrounding FDI in the 
GCC and broader Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) region, Part II 
provides statistical evidence from UNCTAD, the World Bank, and the GCC 
countries themselves outlining the upsurge of FDI in the GCC since 2002, 
followed by a brief overview of FDI levels since 2010. Part III briefly outlines 
and examines the legal framework governing the FDI regimes in the GCC 
states, revealing the unique manner in which the GCC states have promoted 
liberal economic policies while concomitantly maintaining regulatory control 
over important elements of their FDI regimes. Part IV then provides a modest 
contribution to the ongoing debate surrounding the relationship between FDI 
and economic growth by outlining the statistical impact that the increased 
levels of FDI have had on short-term economic growth in the GCC since 2002. 
I. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Although scholars, the media, international institutions, and governments 
or governmental organizations have examined various aspects of FDI in the 
Gulf, no academic study to date has been conducted which examines the 
increase of FDI in the GCC since 2002 or comprehensively analyzes the legal 
framework governing FDI in the GCC. The following is a brief overview of 
the existing literature on the topic. 
To begin with, much of the academic literature on the topic of FDI in the 
GCC is outdated. The dramatic rise in FDI has only occurred since 2002, 
making literature even from the late 1990s and early to mid-2000s outdated.8 
For example, the World Bank’s publication, Trade, Investment, and 
Development in the Middle East and North Africa, examines several key 
elements of the legal regimes governing FDI in the GCC, but because it was 
 
 7 For more on the debate, see infra Part IV.A. 
 8 See, e.g., E. Mick Riordan et al., The World Economy and Its Implications for the Middle East and 
North Africa, 1995–2010, in PROSPECTS FOR MENA ECONOMIES: FROM BOOM TO BUST AND BACK? 15, 16, 
20–21 (Nemat Shafik ed., 1998) (stating that there was “little growth in real oil prices expected through 
2010”); Mona S.W. Bseiso, Inter-Arab Inv. Guarantee Corp., The Role of Government in Promoting FDI in 
the Gulf Region, (Jan. 24, 2003) (unpublished conference paper, Eighth Annual WAIPA Conference), 
available at http://www.fdi.net/documents/WorldBank/databases/waipa/gulfregion.htm; M. Kabir Hassan, 
FDI, Information Technology and Economic Growth in the MENA Region (Econ. Research Forum, 
Conference Paper No. 102003002, 2003), available at http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/1184753796_ 
Kabir_Hassan.pdf. 
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written in 2003, it could not address the dramatic increase in FDI that has taken 
place since 2002.9 Even later studies conducted in 2007 could not fully 
examine the trends emerging in FDI flows into the GCC10 because 2007 and 
2008 saw particularly notable increases in FDI flows into the GCC.11 Not 
surprisingly, studies conducted before the upsurge in FDI into the GCC adopt a 
very pessimistic view of FDI potential in the GCC and broader MENA 
region.12 
While reports written for more business-oriented audiences—such as those 
written by International Business Publications—examine more recent trends, 
they take a rather narrow, business-centric approach and fail to examine 
broader trends regarding FDI within the GCC in comparison to the global 
 
 9 THE WORLD BANK, REPORT NO. 26761, TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 2 (2003) [hereinafter WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT], available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/03/000094946_030925041526 
61/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (“The 1990s were marked by stagnant or declining trade and private 
investment—MENA was the only region in the world to experience a reversal. . . . [T]rade and investment 
reforms have been hesitant and cautious, and outcomes weaker still.”). 
 10 E.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], MAKING REFORMS SUCCEED: MOVING 
FORWARD WITH THE MENA INVESTMENT POLICY AGENDA (2008) [hereinafter MENA INVESTMENT POLICY 
AGENDA]; Muawya Ahmed Hussein, Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries, 5 INT’L REV. BUS. RES. PAPERS 362, 365 (2009) (looking at the FDI 
effect on economic growth in the GCC between 1999 and 2007); Farrukh Iqbal & Mustapha Kamel Nabli, 
Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Development in the Middle East and North Africa, in MUSTAPHA 
KAMEL NABLI, WORLD BANK, BREAKING THE BARRIERS TO HIGHER ECONOMIC GROWTH 305 (2007) (“Even a 
casual observer of international development trends cannot fail to notice that, in the last two decades or so, the 
MENA region has lagged most other regions of the world in both development outcomes (such as growth and 
employment) and international integration (such as trade and foreign investment).” (footnote omitted)); 
Wasseem Mina, The Location Determinants of FDI in the GCC Countries, 17 J. MULTINATIONAL FIN. MGMT. 
336 (2007); Mustapha Sadni Jallab et al., Foreign Direct Investment, Macroeconomic Instability and Economic 
Growth in MENA Countries 4 (Inst. of Econ. Theory & Analysis, Working Paper No. 08-17, 2008), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1170764 (noting that “[f]rom 2001 to 2003, the 
UNCTAD inward FDI performance index shows that the MENA is far behind any other developing region 
except South-Asia” (citation omitted)); Wasseem Mina, Are the GCC FDI Location Determinants Favorable?, 
(Econ. Discussion Papers, No. 2007-23, 2007), available at http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/ 
discussionpapers/2007-23/count; Press Release, Dubai Chamber of Commerce & Indus., Foreign Direct 
Investment and GCC Countries (Aug. 5, 2007), available at http://www.zawya.com/story/ZAWYA200708050 
85717. 
 11 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 12 WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (“[C]ompared with the rest of the 
world, trade and investment climate reforms in the region have been decidedly weak.”); Mina, The Location 
Determinants of FDI in the GCC Countries, supra note 10, at 337, 345. FDI was comparatively weak in the 
GCC during the 1980s and 1990s, even with the rise in crude oil prices during the oil crisis of the 1980s. See 
UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
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marketplace.13 The press and financial institutions are better equipped than 
academics to respond in a timely fashion to FDI fluctuations,14 yet they tend to 
do so devoid of broader academic themes and contexts. 
Partly because it is so outdated, much of the literature has been advisory in 
nature. That is, given the low levels of FDI prior to the upsurge in FDI that 
began in 2002, the literature has tended to prescribe solutions for GCC and 
MENA states as to how to attract more FDI.15 Where the increase in FDI in the 
GCC has been acknowledged, some scholars have attributed the upsurge to the 
increase in oil prices.16 
There have been some country-specific examinations dealing with FDI the 
MENA region,17 the GCC itself,18 and with MENA investment ties to other 
 
 13 See, e.g., 1 INTERNATIONAL MIDDLE EAST AND ARABIC COUNTRIES FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND 
PRIVATIZATION LAW HANDBOOK (Igor S. Oleynik & Natasha Alexander eds., 2006); see also, e.g., WORLD 
BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS IN THE ARAB WORLD 2012, at 13–14 (2012), available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Special-Reports/DB12-Arab 
World.pdf (reporting on business regulations in Arab countries, but specifically not focusing on regulations 
related to foreign investment). 
 14 See, e.g., GCC FDI Flows Decline for Second Consecutive Year in 2010, IBQ (Oct. 16, 2011), http:// 
ibq.com.qa/mediacenter/publications/$Document/Default/en-gb/Copy/$UserFiles/ibqgccbrief161011eng.pdf; 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows into the GCC Region Declined by 15% to USD 50.8 Billion in 2009, AL 
BAWABA (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.albawaba.com/news/foreign-direct-investment-inflows-gcc-region-
declined-15-usd-508-billion-2009. 
 15 WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 1–2 (“With more trade and investment, 
countries in the region will be able to achieve faster growth, reduce poverty, create more jobs, and improve the 
knowledge, skills, and productivity of their work force. . . . The region now needs to deepen and accelerate its 
reform, finishing the process that it has started. It needs to make three fundamental shifts in its sources of 
growth: from oil to nonoil sectors; from public, state-dominated to private, market-oriented activities; and 
from protected, import-substitution to competitive, export-oriented activities. Intensifying trade and investment 
is at the core of all three shifts.”); E. Mick Riordan et al., supra note 8, at 15–16. 
 16 E.g., Ibrahim Saif, The Oil Boom in the GCC Countries, 2002–2008, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT’L PEACE 11 (2009), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec15_saif_final.pdf (“The increase in oil 
prices had a dramatic impact on the external economic position of the GCC countries. . . . [C]ountries of the 
GCC became more attractive to foreign investors, thus attracting high levels of foreign direct investment 
(FDI).”) 
 17 E.g., ASHRAF MISHRIF, INVESTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN EGYPT (2010); Ahmed Kamaly, Evaluation of FDI Flows into the MENA Region, 
(Econ. Research Forum, Conference Paper No. 092002009, 2002), available at http://www.erf.org.eg/ 
CMS/uploads/pdf/1185351142_FM-P_Ahmed_Kamaly.pdf; Peter A. Petri, The Case of Missing Foreign 
Investment in the Southern Mediterranean (OECD Dev. Ctr., Working Paper No. 128, 1997); Imad A. Moosa, 
The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in MENA Countries: An Extreme Bounds Analysis, ECON. 
RESEARCH FORUM (Jan. 2004), http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/1183874104_RR0421.pdf (policy 
research report). 
 18 E.g., LOBNA ALI AL-KHALIFA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BAHRAIN (2010) (published thesis 
discussing the role of FDI in Bahrain’s economic development). 
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countries.19 These studies, however, do not conduct comparative analyses of 
the rate of FDI growth in the GCC in relation to broader, global trends. Nor do 
these studies attempt to examine the legal frameworks governing FDI in each 
state. Some scholarship on FDI in the Middle East has failed to distinguish the 
GCC from the broader MENA region,20 blurring what is otherwise a rather 
distinct line between FDI levels and development in the GCC on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the wider Arab world. 
Overall, the literature is generally outdated and fails to make nuanced 
assessments of the broader trends of FDI in the GCC and the legal regimes 
giving effect to the upsurge in FDI. The literature tends to be advisory in 
nature, although scholars increasingly recognize the impact that legal and 
macroeconomic policy reforms have had on overall FDI levels. Moreover, 
scholars have largely ignored the increase in foreign stock investments in the 
GCC, and have yet to adopt the lessons of the resource-rich states of the Gulf 
to other MENA economies. More importantly, scholars have yet to examine 
the broader FDI trends in the GCC in light of the ongoing revolutions in the 
MENA region. 
II. STATISTICS 
The GCC is a regional economic bloc consisting of six Middle Eastern 
monarchies: Saudi Arabia—which accounted for forty percent of the GCC’s 
gross domestic product (“GDP”) in 2010 and sixty percent of the total GCC 
population21—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates 
(“UAE”).22 Membership offers have been extended to Jordan and Morocco.23 
The GCC was officially created on May 25, 1981, by the leaders of the six 
 
 19 See WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 9. 
 20 See, e.g., Steve Onyeiwu, Analysis of FDI Flows to Developing Countries: Is the MENA Region 
Different? (Econ. Research Forum, Conference Paper No. 102003005, 2003), available at http://www.erf.org. 
eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/1184754629_Steve_Onyeiwu.pdf; Simon Neaime & Marcus Marktanner, The Role of 
Foreign Direct Investment for Economic Development in the MENA Region, TOPICS MIDDLE E. & N. AFR. 
ECONOMIES (Sept. 2009), http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume11/PDFS/Paper-by-Neaime&Marktanner.pdf 
(article published in volume 11 of the online journal Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies). 
 21 GULF INV. CORP., GCC ECONOMIC STATISTICS 8, 9 (10th ed. 2011), available at http://www.gic.com. 
kw/site_media/uploads/gic_ar_crtd_4.20.12.pdf. 
 22 GCC Charter, supra note 1; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, THE WORLD BANK, REPORT NO. 57517, 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC 1–2, 4, 6 (2010) [hereinafter ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC], 
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/10/27/00035 
6161_20101027034540/Rendered/PDF/575170WP0Box353768B01PUBLIC10GCCStudyweb.pdf. 
 23 Amid Turmoil, GCC Extends Invitation to Jordan and Morocco, MIDDLE E. POL’Y COUNCIL (May 16, 
2011), http://www.mepc.org/amid-turmoil-gcc-extends-invitation-jordan-and-morocco. 
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aforementioned Arab states, with the goal of “effect[ing] coordination, 
integration and inter-connection between member states in all fields in order to 
achieve unity between them.”24 Headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the 
GCC is composed of the Supreme Council, a Commission for Settlement of 
Disputes, a Ministerial Council, and a Secretariat General, with a Secretary-
General appointed by the Supreme Council.25 The GCC does not possess 
“supranational competencies” and the Secretariat General is comparatively 
weak.26 There has been mistrust between members, fostered primarily by the 
comparative strength of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in relation to the other four 
states.27 Although several similarities characterize the resource-rich, labor-
importing states of the GCC, “the attitudes towards attracting 
FDI . . . significantly differ from one GCC country to another.”28 
Together, the six GCC member states account for roughly thirty percent of 
the world’s proven oil reserves.29 From the 1970s to the 1990s, GCC member 
states in general relied heavily on public funds generated through oil revenues, 
marginalizing both private and foreign investments.30 In the early 2000s, many 
GCC states began instituting broad reforms designed to encourage more 
domestic and foreign private investment and to diversify the economies.31 In 
addition to several state-led reforms, the GCC organization itself initiated 
several trade- and investment-related initiatives, including the establishment of 
a customs union in 2003.32 
 
 24 GCC Charter, supra note 1, art. 4. 
 25 Id. arts. 2, 6, 8. 
 26 Steffen Hertog, EU–GCC Relations in the Era of the Second Oil Boom 4 (Dec. 2007) (C·A·P Working 
Paper), available at http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/2007_hertog.pdf. 
 27 Robert Haddick, Foreign Policy: The Persian Gulf Needs Its Own NATO, NPR (May 21, 2012), http:// 
www.npr.org/2012/05/21/153196702/foreign-policy-the-persian-gulf-needs-its-own-nato. 
 28 Reyadh Y. Faras & Khalifa H. Ghali, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: The Case of 
the GCC Countries, 29 INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON. 134, 135 (2009). 
 29 See The World Factbook: Oil-Proved Reserves, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012); BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
June 2012, BP 6 (June 2012), http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_ 
and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_ene
rgy_full_report_2012.pdf. 
 30 See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 136. 
 31 Faruk Balli et al., The Patterns of Cross-Border Portfolio Investments in the GCC Region: Do 
Institutional Quality and the Number of Expatriates Play a Role? 3, 17 (Univ. Library of Munich, Ger., MPRA 
Paper No. 19966, 2009), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19966/2/MPRA_paper_19966.pdf. 
 32 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC, supra note 22, at 6. 
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Beginning in 2002, the GCC began to see noticeable increases in FDI 
inflows.33 Sufficient data on FDI inflows and outflows—taken mainly from 
UNCTAD and the World Bank34—exists to enable scholars to make nuanced 
estimations of FDI trends in the GCC during the past decade. 
Part II.A summarizes FDI inflows into GCC countries between 2002 and 
2010, followed by an outline of percentage increases of foreign stock 
investments in the GCC during the same period in Part II.B. Part II.C provides 
a brief overview of FDI trends in the GCC since 2010. 
A. FDI Inflows in GCC Member States, 2002–2010 
UNCTAD defines FDI as follows: 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as an investment involving 
a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control 
by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent 
enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of 
the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or 
foreign affiliate). . . . Such investment involves both the initial 
transaction between the two entities and all subsequent transactions 
between them and among foreign affiliates, both incorporated and 
unincorporated.35 
Between 2002 and 2010, the GCC witnessed a 2533% increase in FDI, as 
indicated in Table 1.36 This increase is over twenty times the increase in global 
FDI levels, roughly ten times the increase in FDI levels in developing 
economies, and roughly five times the increase in FDI levels witnessed in 
transition economies worldwide. 
  
 
 33 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 34 Id.; Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX. 
KLT.DINV.CD.WD (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
 35 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2009, Annex at 243, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2009, U.N. 
Sales No. E.09.II.D.15 (2009) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2009] (footnote omitted), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2009_en.pdf. In addition, UNCTAD states that: “Flows of FDI comprise capital 
provided (either directly or through other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise, 
or capital received from an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor. FDI has three components: equity 
capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans.” Id. 
 36 See infra Table 1. 
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Table 1. Inward FDI Flows—Developing, Transition, and Developed 
Economies37 
 
2002* 2010* Percentage 
Increase 
GCC $1515 $39,892 2533.14% 
World $627,975 $1,309,001 108.45% 
Developing Economies $173,283 $616,661 255.87% 
Transition Economies $11,260 $73,755 555.02% 
Developed Economies $443,432 $618,586 39.50% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
Table 1 reveals that among developing economies, the average increase in 
FDI levels was roughly 256%. Developing economies experienced higher 
year-to-year percentage increases in FDI than developed economies,38 and 
therefore represent a more representative sample for comparative purposes. 
Table 2 provides a comparison between the GCC and developing economies in 
each major economic region of the world. As Table 2 indicates, even among 
developing economies, the GCC percentage increase from 2002 to 2010 was 
markedly higher.39 
Table 2. Inward FDI Flows—Developing Economies Breakdown by Region40 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
 
 37 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Id. 
 40 Id. 
 2002* 2010* Percentage Increase 
GCC $1515 $39,892 2533.14% 
Developing Economies: 
Africa 
$14,630 $43,122 194.75% 
Developing Economies: 
America 
$58,447 $187,401 220.63% 
Developing Economies: Asia $100,083 $384,063 283.74% 
Developing Economies: 
Oceania 
$123 $2075 1586.99% 
Developing Economies 
excluding Least Developed 
Countries (“LDCs”) 
$166,441 $599,762 260.35% 
Developing Economies 
excluding China 
$120,540 $501,927 316.40% 
LDCs $6842 $16,899 146.99% 
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The GCC rate of increase for FDI inflows was higher than the increase 
among high-, middle-, and low-income developing economies, as evidenced in 
Table 3. 
Table 3. Inward FDI Flows—High-, Middle-, and Low-Income Developing 
Economies41 
 2002* 2010* Percentage Increase 
GCC $1515 $39,892 2533.14% 
High-income developing 
economies 
$63,190 $317,198 401.97% 
Middle-income developing 
economies 
$92,237 $222,545 141.28% 
Low-income developing 
economies 
$17,857 $76,918 330.74% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
Emerging economies and the “Newly Industrialized Asian Countries” 
(“NIACs”) have also been associated with growth and high levels of FDI.42 As 
evidenced in Table 4, the GCC had a noticeably higher percentage increase 
between 2002 and 2010 than did the average emerging economy and the 
NIACs. 
Table 4. Inward FDI Flows—Emerging Economies and Newly Industrialized 
Asian Countries43 
 2002* 2010* Percentage Increase 
GCC $1515 $39,892 2533.14% 
Emerging economies $64,887 $178,574 175.21% 
Newly Industrialized Asian 
Countries 
$29,017 $164,615 467.31% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
Table 5 provides comparative statistics for prominent geographic regions of 
the world. As indicated in Table 5, Western Asia—the regional grouping of 
states that, with the exception of the GCC, saw the highest percentage increase 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 See YUJIRO HAYAMI & YOSHIHISA GODO, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: FROM THE POVERTY TO THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 2 (3d ed. 2005) (referring to the growth of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). 
See generally ANIS CHOWDHURY & IYANATUL ISLAM, THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALISING ECONOMIES OF EAST 
ASIA (1993) (discussing the factors contributing to the high-levels of growth in East Asian newly 
industrializing economies).  
 43 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
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of FDI flows during the period from 2002 to 201044—experienced only half 
the percentage increase of FDI flows that the GCC witnessed during the same 
period. 
Table 5. Inward FDI Flows—Regions of the World45 
 2002* 2010* Percentage Increase 
GCC $1515 $39,892 2533.14% 
Northern Africa $3872 $15,709 305.71% 
South America $27,990 $90,357 222.82% 
Eastern Asia $67,707 $201,364 197.40% 
Southern Asia $10,713 $31,746 196.33% 
Western Asia $4396 $58,193 1223.77% 
South-Eastern Asia $17,268 $92,760 437.18% 
Northern Africa (excluding 
Sudan) 
$3159 $13,645 331.94% 
South America (excluding 
Brazil) 
$11,400 $41,851 267.11% 
Eastern and Southeastern Asia 
excluding China 
$32,232 $179,390 456.56% 
Southern Asia excluding India $5083 $7586 49.24% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
Among prominent regional-economic unions, the GCC had a noticeably 
higher percentage increase in FDI inflows between 2002 and 2010, as 
indicated in Table 6. 
  
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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Table 6. Inward FDI Flows—Regional Economic/Political Unions46 
 2002* 2010* Percentage Increase 
GCC $1515 $39,892 2533.14% 
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) $2580 $7390 186.43% 
ECOWAS (Economic 
Community of West African 
States) 
$2846 $11,695 310.93% 
League of Arab States $7257 $65,137 797.57% 
Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) 
$27,012 $135,249 400.70% 
Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) 
$27,990 $90,357 222.82% 
NAFTA $120,539 $242,027 100.79% 
OAS $153,381 $343,379 123.87% 
ASEAN $17,268 $92,733 437.02% 
EU $312,003 $318,227 1.99% 
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation) 
$238,866 $632,085 164.62% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
Similarly, the GCC’s percentage increase in FDI between 2002 and 2010 
dramatically outpaced the percentage increases of the G8, the G20, and the 
G77, as revealed in Table 7.  
Table 7. Inward FDI Flows—G8, G20, G7747 
 2002* 2010* Percentage Increase 
GCC $1515 $39,892 2533.14% 
G8 $253,000 $400,635 58.35% 
G20 $375,778 $712,008 89.48% 
G77 $143,668 $515,366 258.72% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
As stated above, some scholars have attributed the upsurge in FDI in the 
GCC since 2002 to the rise in oil prices.48 Table 8 reveals that the major 
petroleum and gas exporting states all indeed experienced higher FDI 
percentage increases from 2002 to 2010.49 However, the GCC’s percentage 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 49 This trend was especially pronounced from 2002 to 2008 in the GCC, during the so-called second oil 
boom. See Saif, supra note 16, at 2. 
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increase in FDI levels was notably higher than that of developed petroleum 
economies, three times that of transition petroleum economies, and six times 
that of developing petroleum economies.50 
Table 8. Inward FDI Flows—Major Petroleum and Gas Exporting Countries51 
 2002* 2010* Percentage Increase 
GCC $1515 $39,892 2533.14% 
Major petroleum and gas 
exporters 
$17,500 $124,608 612.05% 
Major petroleum and gas 
exporters: Developing 
economies 
$10,658 $53,033 397.59% 
Major petroleum and gas 
exporters: Transition 
economies 
$6051 $54,056 793.34% 
Major petroleum and gas 
exporters: Developed 
economies 
$791 $17,519 2114.79% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
The data suggests that although the rise in the price of oil contributed to the 
increased levels of FDI among petroleum and gas exporters from 2002 to 2010, 
oil price was not the sole impetus to such increases within the GCC (or, as 
shown below, at least within certain GCC member states). Such a conclusion is 
substantiated by the variation among GCC member states with respect to the 
percentage increases of FDI levels between 2002 and 2010. As indicated by 
Table 9, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE each experienced a percentage 
increase in FDI levels exceeding 5600%; Oman and Qatar, on the other hand, 
experienced percentage increases in FDI inflows similar to those of other 
major petroleum and gas exporters, with 836% and 648% increases, 
respectively. Bahrain experienced a net percentage decline of twenty eight 
percent in FDI inflows.52  
  
 
 50 See infra Table 8. 
 51 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 52 See id. 
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Table 9. Inward FDI Flows—Individual GCC Member States53 
 2002* 2010* Percentage Increase 
Bahrain $217 $156 -28.11% 
Kuwait $4 $319 7875.00% 
Oman $122 $1142 836.07% 
Qatar $624 $4670 648.40% 
Saudi Arabia $453 $28,105 6104.19% 
UAE $95 $5500 5689.47% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
The data reinforces the fact that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE 
dramatically outperformed other major petroleum and gas exporters in terms of 
percentage increase in FDI flows between 2002 and 2010, suggesting again 
that such increases in FDI inflows cannot be explained solely by the increase in 
the price of oil.54 
Although the percentage increase of FDI in the GCC between 2002 and 
2010 is notable, the levels of FDI inflows should be interpreted as a percentage 
of global FDI inflows. Table 10 compares the GCC with eight other regional 
economic unions—the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(“SAARC”),55 Economic Cooperation Organization (“ECO”),56 Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”),57 Central American Common Market 
(“CACM”),58 Southern African Customs Union (“SACU”),59 Economic 
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”),60 Commonwealth of 
Independent States (“CIS”),61 and European Free Trade Association 
(“EFTA”)62—with roughly the same63 combined percentage of global FDI 
inflows in 2002. 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 See supra Table 9. 
 55 Member states include: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka. UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 56 Member states include: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Id. 
 57 Member states include: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Id. 
 58 Member states include: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Id. 
 59 Member states include: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. Id. 
 60 Member states include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Id. 
 61 Member states include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, 
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Id. 
 62 Member states include: Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. Id. 
TOONE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:09 PM 
692 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
Table 10. Inward FDI Flows as a Percentage of Total Global FDI Inflows—
Regional Economic Unions64 
Table 10 demonstrates that although the GCC countries experienced a marked 
rise in FDI as a percentage of global FDI inflows between 2002 and 2008, in 
2010 the GCC countries continue to lag behind other regional economic 
unions, such as ASEAN and CIS, in the total share of world FDI inflows. 
Table 10 should be examined, however, in light of the GDP to FDI inflow 
ratio. In other words, although ASEAN and CIS enjoy a larger share of global 
FDI inflows, they also boast much larger GDPs. Table 11 reveals that among 
the other eight regional economic unions, the GCC ranks similar to ASEAN, 




 63 Id. ASEAN nations had noticeably more FDI inflows in 2002 than the other regional economic unions. 
See infra Table 10.  
 64 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
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Table 11. FDI of the GCC as a Percentage of GDP Ratio—Other Regional 
Economic Unions65 
 2010 GDP 2010 FDI Inflows* GDP to FDI Ratio 
GCC $1,080,915 $39,892 3.69% 
SAARC $2,047,966 $28,098 1.37% 
ECO $1,526,99466 $31,932 2.09% 
ASEAN $1,814,69567 $92,733 5.11% 
CACM $149,098 $3694 2.48% 
SACU $395,438 $2690 0.68% 
ECOWAS $309,358 $11,695 3.78% 
CIS $1,828,642 $68,966 3.77% 
EFTA $964,52468 $38,145 3.95% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
The GCC’s GDP to FDI ratio is also higher than those of Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China (“BRIC”), as shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. GCC FDI as a Percentage of GDP Ratio—BRIC Countries69 
 2010 GDP 2010 Inward FDI* FDI as a % of GDP Ratio 
GCC $1,080,915 $39,892 3.69% 
Brazil $2,143,035 $48,506 2.26% 
Russia $1,487,515 $43,288 2.91% 
India $1,684,323 $24,159 1.43% 
China $5,930,529 $114,734 1.93% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
With the exception of Bahrain and Kuwait, the individual GCC member 
states boasted comparatively high FDI to GDP ratios in 2010, with Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar each outperforming the global average.70 
 
 65 Id.; Data: GDP, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter World Bank GDP Statistics]. 
 66 The 2010 data from Iran, a member of ECO, is not available. The 2009 figure is used for the 2010 
ECO calculations. See World Bank GDP Statistics, supra note 65. 
 67 Data for ASEAN does not include the 2010 GDP figures for Myanmar, for which no data is available. 
See id. 
 68 The 2010 data from Liechtenstein is not available. The 2009 figure is used instead. See id.  
 69 World Bank GDP Statistics, supra note 65; UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 70 See Data: Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, http://data. 
worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).  
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B. Foreign Stock Investments in GCC Member States, 2002–2010.71 
In addition to experiencing a dramatic percentage increase in the inward 
flow of FDI from 2002 to 2010, the GCC also experienced similar rises in 
foreign stock investments during the same period.72 UNCTAD defines FDI 
stock as “the value of the share of . . . capital and reserves (including retained 
profits) attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of 
affiliates to the parent enterprise.”73 Table 13 compares the percentage increase 
of foreign stock investments in the GCC to the same economies against which 
the inflows of FDI to the GCC were compared in Tables 1 through 8 above.74 
 
Table 13. Inward Foreign Direct Investment of Stock—Global Sample75 
 
2002* 2010* Percentage 
Increase 
GCC $31,435 $319,347 915.90% 
World $7,501,217 $19,906,662 165.38% 
Developing Economies $1,730,852 $6,256,066 261.44% 
Transition Economies $115,419 $759,687 558.20% 
Developed Economies $5,654,947 $12,890,909 127.96% 
Developing Economies: Africa $166,535 $561,354 237.08% 
Developing Economies: 
America $529,011 $1,963,581 271.18% 
Developing Economies: Asia $1,032,560 $3,716,491 259.93% 
Developing Economies: Oceania $2746 $14,641 433.18% 
Developing Economies 
excluding LDCs $1,680,543 $6,114,917 263.87% 
Developing Economies 
excluding China $1,514,349 $5,668,249 274.30% 
LDCs $50,309 $141,149 180.56% 
High-income developing 
countries $1,032,562 $3,506,051 239.55% 
 
 71 UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics, supra note 4. 
 72 Id. 
 73 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2009, supra note 35, at 243. M. Sornarajah defines FDI stock (“portfolio 
investment”) as “a movement of money for the purpose of buying shares in a company formed or functioning 
in another country. It could also include other security instruments through which capital is raised for 
ventures.” M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 8 (3d ed. 2010). As 
Sornarajah points out, the “distinguishing element” between foreign investment and portfolio investment “is 
that, in portfolio investment, there is a separation between, on the one hand, management and control of the 
company and, on the other, the share of ownership in it.” Id. 
 74 See UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics, supra note 4; supra Tables 1–8. 
 75 UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics, supra note 4. 
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Middle-income developing 
countries $544,513 $2,065,489 279.33% 
Low-income developing 
countries $153,776 $684,526 345.14% 
Major Oil and Gas Exporters $247,067 $1,232,919 399.02% 
Major Oil/Gas Exporters: 
Developing Economies $117,938 $488,589 314.28% 
Major Oil/Gas Exporters: 
Transition Economies $86,348 $572,414 562.92% 
Major Oil/Gas Exporters: 
Developed Economies $42,781 $171,916 301.85% 
Emerging Economies $648,364 $2,181,366 236.44% 
Newly Industrialized Asian 
Countries $664,794 $2,161,714 225.17% 
Developing Economies: 
Northern Africa  $55,823 $205,013 267.26% 
Developing Economies: South 
America  $273,248.8 $1,121,226 310.33% 
Developing Economies: Eastern 
Asia $650,076 $1,888,439 190.50% 
Developing Economies: 
Southern Asia $43,797 $266,641 508.81% 
Developing Economies: Western 
Asia $65,188 $587,781 801.67% 
Developing Economies: South-
Eastern Asia $273,499 $973,631 255.99% 
Northern Africa excluding 
Sudan $53,138 $184,902 247.97% 
South American excluding 
Brazil $172,386 $446,462 158.99% 
Eastern and South-Eastern Asia 
excluding China $707,073 $2,274,252 221.64% 
Southern Asia excluding India $17,970 $61,949 244.74% 
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) $32,317 $114,169 253.28% 
ECOWAS (Economic 
Community of West African 
States) $37,334 $92,529 147.84% 
League of Arab States $102,582 $610,633 495.26% 
OIC $251,313 $1,335,459 431.41% 
Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) $273,173 $1,121,150 310.42% 
NAFTA $2,387,371 $4,312,153 80.62% 
OAS $2,708,253 $5,563,412 105.42% 
ASEAN $273,499 $973,489 255.94% 
EU $2,958,992 $7,289,629 146.36% 
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APEC $3,684,916 $8,612,891 133.73% 
G8 $3,793,728 $7,925,909 108.92% 
G20 $4,606,969 $11,098,916 140.92% 
G77 $1,443,012 $5,244,344 263.43% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
As indicated in Table 13, only the group of developing economies in 
Western Asia (801.67%) comes close to the GCC’s 915.9% increase of foreign 
stock. While foreign stock purchases are not as impactful on the economy of 
the host state as regular FDI inflows, they nonetheless represent international 
investor confidence in the host state’s legal structure, institutional quality, 
economic stability, and economic growth,76 all of which also factor into regular 
FDI. 
Table 14 illustrates the percentage increase in foreign stock investments for 
individual GCC member states. 
Table 14. Inward Foreign Direct Investment of Stock in GCC Member States77 
 2002* 2010* 
Percentage 
Increase 
Bahrain $6203 $15,154 144.30% 
Kuwait $444 $11,235 2430.41% 
Oman $1874 $14,217 658.64% 
Qatar $2831 $30,564 979.62% 
Saudi Arabia $17,734 $170,450 861.15% 
UAE $2348 $77,727 3210.35% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
C. FDI Trends Since 2010 
Data regarding global FDI levels during 2011 was recently released by 
UNCTAD, revealing that FDI inflows in the GCC decreased in 2011 by thirty-
five percent.78 FDI inflows decreased from roughly forty billion U.S. dollars in 
2010 to roughly twenty-six billion U.S. dollars in 201179—levels not seen 
 
 76 See World Development Indicators Data: Financial Sector, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
about/world-development-indicators-data/financial-sector (last visited Nov. 15, 2012). 
 77 UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics, supra note 4. 
 78 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 79 Id. 
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since 2005.80 Nonetheless, some individual GCC countries have seen 
increases81 and some projections for future FDI levels are positive.82 
For the purposes of the present study, the decreases in FDI levels since 
2010 do not alter the scholarly value of the dramatic upsurge in FDI between 
2002 and 2010, as scholars can still make nuanced assessments of the 
relationship between increased levels of FDI and economic growth with the 
available data. The decrease in FDI since 2009 constitutes a marked shift in 
FDI patterns over the past decade.83 This decrease may actually enable 
scholars to ascertain more definitively the relationship, if any, between FDI 
levels and both short-term and, in particular, long-term economic growth. 
More pronounced FDI trends such as this are a boon when examining the very 
delicate statistical correlation between FDI levels and economic growth. 
Overall, between 2002 and 2010, FDI in the GCC—both through regular 
FDI channels as well as foreign stock investments—increased dramatically, at 
a pace that rivals other developing, transitioning, and emerging economies.84 
The percentage increase of FDI in the GCC was markedly higher than that of 
the rest of the world, even following the 2008 global financial crisis, which hit 
the UAE particularly hard.85 While FDI inflows into the GCC still constitute a 
relatively small portion of global FDI flows, FDI inflows and FDI as a 
percentage of GDP indicate that the GCC has relatively strong locational 
determinants,86 making the GCC markets an attractive option for foreign 
investors.87 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE saw increases in FDI in 2011. Id. (using data from the GCC table). 
 82 See, e.g., Pratap John, Qatar Projects Set To Boost FDI Flows into GCC, GULF TIMES (July 15, 2012), 
at 1; USD 500 Billion Expected Surpluses for GCC Countries in 2012, KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 10, 
2012), http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2257144&language=en. 
 83 UNCTAD, World Investment Prospects Survey: 2009–2011, 9, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/8 
(2009). 
 84 See supra Table 12. 
 85 MAY KHAMIS ET AL., IMF, IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE GULF COOPERATION 
COUNCIL COUNTRIES AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 16, 19, 21 (2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/dp/2010/dp1001.pdf. 
 86 See JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANNA M. LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 99–103, 323–27 (Edward Elgar Publ’g, 2d ed. 2008) (1993). Some of the locational determinates 
that John Dunning lists are input prices, distribution of resources, transportation and communication costs, 
investment incentives, trade barriers, infrastructure, and the legal and regulatory system. Id. at 101–02 box 4.1. 
These factors can affect whether a corporation decides to engage in FDI in a particular country. Id. at 100. 
Locational determinants are a subset of Dunning’s ownership-location-internalization paradigm. Id. at 99–100. 
 87 Mohammed Elsidafy, GCC Remains an Attractive Option for Foreign Capital, EMIRATES 24/7 (Feb. 
16, 2009), http://www.emirates247.com/eb247/economy/uae-economy/gcc-remains-an-attractive-option-for-
foreign-capital-2009-02-16-1.92494. 
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III.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING FDI IN THE GCC 
One of the primary factors behind the upsurge in FDI inflows has been the 
removal of legal and regulatory barriers to FDI. State-led reforms—initiated in 
some GCC states as far back as the 1980s, but systematically adopted by GCC 
states around 2000—opened the door to FDI in the GCC.88 Concomitant to 
such reforms, however, was a deliberate exercise of regulatory authority by 
GCC states over strategic elements of their respective FDI regimes.89 Although 
each GCC member state has legislated its own FDI regime,90 enough 
similarities exist between the FDI regimes of individual member states to 
warrant a brief, thematic overview of FDI policies in the GCC. 
Part III.A examines the neoliberal policies governing several aspects of the 
FDI regimes of GCC states. Part III.B outlines a few prominent ways in which 
GCC states have maintained or asserted regulatory control over strategic 
aspects of their FDI regimes in spite of otherwise neoliberal reforms. 
A. Neoliberal Economic Policies in GCC Member States’ FDI Regimes 
In the past decade, GCC members states—as well as other MENA states—
have modified their investment laws (UAE, Oman) or created new ones 
altogether (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia).91 These reforms have revolved around the 
standards promoted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”), codified most recently in the 2006 MENA–OECD 
Investment Programme.92 The following sections briefly examine some of the 
principle reforms undertaken by GCC states. 
 
 88 See Hussein, supra note 10, at 363. 
 89 See id. 
 90 For state-specific analyses, see, for example, K. Mellahi et al., Motives for Foreign Direct Investment 
in Oman, 45 THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 431 (2003); see also, e.g., AL-KHALIFA, supra note 18. 
 91 See Mellahi, supra note 90, at 433. See also Kuwait Eyes New ‘Investment Law,’ ARAB TIMES KUWAIT 
ENG. DAILY, http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/164499/reftab/73/ 
Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2012); Lucia Dore, UAE Foreign Investment Law by 2008, KHALEEJ TIMES 
(Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/business/2007/March/ 
business_March639.xml&section=business; New Foreign Investment Law, SAUDI ARABIA MARKET INFO. 
RESOURCE & DIRECTORY, http://www.saudinf.com/main/c552.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 92 MENA INVESTMENT POLICY AGENDA, supra note 10; see also OECD, MENA–OECD INVESTMENT 
PROGRAMME: MINISTERIAL DECLARATION AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (2006), available at http://www.oecd. 
org/mena/investment/37520012.pdf. 
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1. Diversification 
It is no secret that the six labor-rich states of the GCC all depend on oil and 
gas for government revenues and foreign investment. Qatar is one of the 
world’s top exporters of liquefied natural gas, while the GCC states hold 
roughly thirty percent of the world’s oil reserves, seventeen percent of the 
world’s gas reserves, and GCC production of oil accounts for more than twenty 
percent of global production.93 Oil and gas, in this sense, are the engine of the 
GCC economy, and the GCC will continue to utilize its unique resources as 
leverage in its continued economic growth.94 
As outlined above, FDI inflows into the GCC during the second oil boom 
increased at a rate higher than rates in other major petroleum and gas 
producing economies.95 As Table 15 indicates, however, the rate at which FDI 
inflows within individual GCC member states increased from 2002 to 2008 
was substantially higher than the rates of increase for the other top twenty-five 
oil-producing countries in the world during this same period. 
Table 15. FDI Inflows Among Top 2596 Oil-Producing States (2002 & 2008)97 
 2002 2008 Percentage Increase 
Saudi Arabia $453 $38,151 8321.85% 
Russia $3461 $75,002 2067.06% 
US $74,501 $306,366 311.22% 
Iran $3657 $1909 -47.80% 
China $52,743 $108,312 105.36% 
Canada $22,155 $57,177 158.08% 
Mexico $23,883 $27,140 13.88% 
UAE $95 $13,724 14,346.32% 
Nigeria $2040 $8249 304.36% 
 
 93 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012, supra note 29, at 4, 6, 20. 
 94 Contra M. Nagy Eltony, The Future Role of Gulf Oil in World Energy Demand, in ARAB BUSINESS: 
THE GLOBALIZATION IMPERATIVE 92, 104 (Ali Al-Shamali & John Denton eds., 2000) (arguing that GCC 
countries should diversify their economies instead of relying on their oil reserves). 
 95 See supra Table 8. 
 96 The World Factbook: Oil-Production, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2173rank.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). Iraq, which ranks ninth among oil-producing 
states, was excluded from this list for this Article due to the events associated with the Iraq War and their 
impact on FDI inflows during the early stages of the Iraq War. Id. Bahrain is ranked as the sixty-third highest 
oil producing state. Id. 
 97 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
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Kuwait98 $4 $-6 -250.00% 
Venezuela $782 $1195 52.81% 
Brazil $16,590 $45,058 171.60% 
EU $312,003 $542,242 73.79% 
Norway $791 $10,564 1235.52% 
Algeria $1065 $2594 143.57% 
Angola $1672 $1679 0.42% 
Libya $145 $3180 2093.10% 
Kazakhstan $2,590 $14,322 452.97% 
Qatar $624 $3779 505.61% 
UK $24,029 $91,489 280.74% 
Azerbaijan $1392 $14 -98.99% 
Indonesia $189699 $9318 391.46% 
India $5630 $43,406 670.98% 
Oman $122 $2952 2319.67% 
Bahrain (63rd) $217 $1794 726.73% 
    
Average increase of all GCC states (including Bahrain) 4328.36% 
Overall average increase: (excluding Bahrain) 1400.98% 
Overall average increase of all non-GCC producers: 419.01% 
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates. 
Oil prices, adjusted for inflation, increased from $29.12 in 2002 to $97.33 in 
2008, for an increase of 234%.100 Table 15 reveals that the average overall 
increase in FDI inflows among the top twenty-five non-GCC oil-producing 
states was roughly 594%. The average percentage increase during the same 
period for GCC member states was 4328%, suggesting that both oil and non-
oil sectors benefitted from increased FDI.101 
A brief overview of the diversification efforts by GCC member states 
reveals that, indeed, the non-oil sector has benefitted from increased FDI 
inflows as a result of several changes instituted by GCC member states. GCC 
countries have reduced the number of sectors that were previously closed to 
 
 98 In 2007, Kuwait’s FDI was $112 million. Id. In 2009, its FDI was $1114 million, which constitutes a 
27,750% increase. See id. 
 99 $1896 million is the 2004 figure. 
 100 Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table), INFLATIONDATA.COM, http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/ 
Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 101 See supra Table 15. 
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foreign investors.102 Foreign investors may now invest in a broad range of 
sectors, including tourism, renewable energy,103 energy and feedstock-
intensive heavy industries, education, real estate, environmental technologies 
and financial instruments, petrochemicals, infrastructure, health and medicine, 
construction, transportation (including railways), agriculture, food and 
beverages, mining,104 services,105 banking and financial services, airline, steel, 
transportation, pharmaceuticals,106 satellite-transmission services,107 
wholesale/distribution, and telecommunications.108 
Privatization efforts have also been successful.109 In Oman, the 
privatization process was inaugurated by royal decree in 1996.110 Among other 
things, the law “unbundl[es] and corporatiz[es] the ministry’s existing 
activities into a number of separate generation, transmission, and distribution 
businesses, which will be initially owned by the government and then 
privatized.”111 Abu Dhabi has been particularly active on the privatization 
front, most notably in the domain of water and electricity, where the Abu 
Dhabi Water and Electricity Company has balanced demand and supply of 
water and electricity through sales contracts and Bulk Supply Tarriffs with the 
distribution companies.112 
 
 102 See Saif, supra note 16, at 5. 
 103 See, e.g., Veronica Cinti, The Countries’ Growth Beyond Oil: The Special Case of Saudi Arabia, 1 
WORLD REV. BUS. RES. 136, 149 (2011); Reem Shamseddine, Renewables To Contribute to Saudi Power Mix, 
REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/21/us-mideast-summit-saudi-
power-idUSTRE69J2OF20101021. 
 104 Moin Siddiqi, MENA—The Heaven of Foreign Direct Investment, GLOBAL ARAB NETWORK (June 2, 
2009), http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/200906021019/Economics/mena-the-heaven-of-foreign-
direct-investment.html. 
 105 Uri Dadush & Lauren Falcao, Regional Arrangements in the Arabian Gulf, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
FOR INT’L PEACE (2009), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/gcc1.pdf. 
 106 GCC Looking To Expand Its Horizons, PHARMA & HEALTHCARE (Mar. 2007), http://www. 
pharmaceuticalsinsight.com/file/43716/gcc-looking-to-expand-its-horizons.html. 
 107 Siddiqi, supra note 104. 
 108 E.g., UGO FASANO & ZUBAIR IQBAL, GCC COUNTRIES: FROM OIL INDEPENDENCE TO DIVERSIFICATION 
14 (2003). 
 109 See GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE, GCC MACROECONOMIC—CHANGING PARADIGMS 7, 19 (2009) 
(illustrating the FDI inflows into non-oil sectors of the GCC economy). 
 110 See Oman: Action Plan, BUS. MIDDLE E., Nov. 1–15, 1996, at 4. 
 111 Loren Page Ambinder et al., The Mirage Becomes Reality: Privatization and Project Finance 
Developments in the Middle East Power Market, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029, 1032 n.19 (2001). 
 112 ABU DHABI WATER & ELECTRICITY COMPANY, http://www.adwec.ae (last visited Oct. 12, 2012); see 
also Ambinder et al., supra note 111, at 1035. ADWEC is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Abu Dhabi Water 
and Electricity Authority. ABU DHABI WATER & ELECTRICITY COMPANY, supra. 
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The Saudi Government recently announced that it would split the Saudi 
Electric Company, currently the largest utility provider in the Gulf, into “four 
independent power generation companies to encourage more competition.”113 
Several investment opportunities and joint venture projects with the Saudi 
Electric Company have also been announced.114 
With regards to infrastructure, Saudi Arabia has undertaken vast public-
private partnerships (“PPPs”) to build a series of “economic cities” throughout 
Saudi Arabia.115 Emirates Dubai and Abu Dhabi of the UAE116 have 
undertaken similar public-private partnerships, as has Bahrain.117 It has been 
said “every third crane in the world is located somewhere in the Gulf and most 
of them are deployed in Dubai alone.”118 
Economic diversification efforts throughout the gulf have opened up the 
Gulf economies to domestic and foreign investment, expanding the 
governments’ sources of revenue to several non-oil sectors.119 
2. Trade 
It has been generally established in the literature that trade openness has a 
positive impact on the FDI inflow.120 Indeed, it seems apparent that increased 
trade openness and developed trading ties encourage FDI.121 Following a 
decade of protracted negotiations, Saudi Arabia acceded to the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) in 2005, “making it the last GCC country to enter the 
global free trade framework.”122 Since then, GCC countries have continued to 
 
 113 Saudi Electricity Company, ARABIANBUSINESS, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/companies/saudi-
electricity-company-66578.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
 114 Investment Opportunities, SAUDI ELECTRICITY COMPANY, http://www.se.com.sa/SEC/English/Menu/ 
Partners/chances/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 115 E.g., P.K. Abdul Ghafour, Economic Cities Draw Foreign Investment: SAGIA Chief, ARABNEWS 
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.arabnews.com/node/356295. 
 116 See, e.g., Think Science Contest Invites Emirati Scientific Talents, EDARABIA, http://www.edarabia. 
com/60560/think-science-contest-invites-emirati-scientific-talents (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) 
 117 See, e.g., Abdul-Haq Mohammed, Can Public Private Partnerships Solve Bahrain’s Housing Crisis?, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/housing-network/2012/feb/15/public-private-
partnership-bahrain-housing. 
 118 Mahmood Rafique, GCC’s Energy Sector to Keep Attracting FDI, ARABNEWS (Dec. 6, 2007), http:// 
www.arabnews.com/node/306451. 
 119 See Dania Saadi, Gulf States Move to Diversify Income Sources, N.Y. TIMES, (July 18, 2012), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/gulf-states-move-to-diversify-income-sources.html. 
 120 Mina, Are the GCC FDI Location Determinants Favorable?, supra note 10, at 13. 
 121 Id. at 12–13. 
 122 Jasim Ali, GCC Focus: Attracting FDI Calls for an Attitude Shift, GULF NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011), http:// 
gulfnews.com/business/economy/gcc-focus-attracting-fdi-calls-for-an-attitude-shift-1.846327. 
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expand their trade relationships. In April 2008, for example, the GCC finalized 
negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) with the European Free 
Trade Association.123 In addition to trade agreements that individual GCC 
member states have with other trading partners, the GCC has entered into FTA 
negotiations with other regional economic unions, including the EU.124 
The GCC has a large trade deficit in comparison to other emerging 
economies (more imports than exports).125 Nonetheless, the GCC has adopted 
a relatively open trade policy.126 This manifests the dependence and 
incorporation of GCC economies in the international market,127 a factor that 
favorably influences FDI inflows.128 
Given their strategic geographic location, GCC states will remain attractive 
trading partners. Although intra-GCC trade has been lacking,129 GCC states 
have not shied away from promoting open trade policies.130 Such policies have 
reinforced FDI in the GCC member states, 131 and will continue to do so as the 
GCC states continue to open their borders to intra-GCC and global trading 
partners. 
GCC states—especially the two principal emirates, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, 
in the UAE—have also enjoyed widespread success in the creation and 
management of free trade zones (“FTZ”).132 Dubai’s FTZ, for example, is 
highly sophisticated, enabling thousands of international businesses to conduct 
 
 123 The EFTA States and GCC Sign Free Trade Agreement, EFTA (June 22, 2009), http://www.efta.int/ 
free-trade/free-trade-news/2009-06-22-efta-gcc-sign-fta.aspx. 
 124 International Affairs-Free Trade Agreements, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
policies/international/facilitating-trade/free-trade/ (last updated Feb. 2, 2012). 
 125 Aysu İnsel & Mahmut Tekçe, Bilateral Trade Flows of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: A 
New Approach to Gravity Model, TOPICS MIDDLE E. & N. AFR. ECONOMIES 16 (Sept. 2009), http://www.luc. 
edu/orgs/meea/volume11/PDFS/Paper-by-Insel&Tekce.pdf (article published in volume 11 of the online 
journal Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies). 
 126 See ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC, supra note 22, 17, 18 fig.7. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Mina, Are the GCC FDI Location Determinants Favorable?, supra note 10, at 12–13. 
 129 See, e.g., Joel Bowman, Intra-GCC Trade Still Problematic for Many, ARABIANBUSINESS (Apr. 8, 
2008, 12:34 PM), http://www.arabianbusiness.com/intra-gcc-trade-still-problematic-for-many-51140.html. But 
see Dadush & Falcao, supra note 105, at 2 (“Many of the GCC’s efforts have thus far been targeted at 
lowering tariffs between member states.”). 
 130 See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
 131 See Dadush & Falcao, supra note 106, at 2, 4. 
 132 See UAE Freezones: Air and Sea Ports and Free Zones, MAZARS, http://gcc.mazars.com/Home/ 
Contact-us/Frequently-Asked-Questions/Frequently-Asked-Questions-for-the-UAE/UAE-Freezones (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
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trade and expand their businesses in a comparatively open regulatory 
environment.133 
3. Bilateral Investment Treaties 
As with the relationship between trade and FDI, scholars have examined 
the relationship between Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”), and FDI.134 In 
general, the conclusion in the literature is that, in the MENA region, BITs play 
a part in attracting FDI, although to a lesser extent than trade.135 The leading 
determinant for FDI in the MENA region appears to be market size.136 
In the GCC specifically, some scholars have come to the conclusion that 
“BITs contracted with high-income non-OECD countries, such as Kuwait and 
UAE, has a positive FDI influence. . . . On the other hand, BITs contracted 
with high-income OECD and upper middle income countries have a negative 
FDI influence, while government stability, as a domestic institution, has a 
positive influence.”137 Wasseem Mina argues that within GCC countries, “the 
rationale for contracting bilateral investment treaties seems controversial and 
goes beyond attracting FDI to strengthening bilateral economic and political 
relationships . . . .”138 Mina concludes that “the empirical evidence seems to 
suggest that institutional development and targeting BIT partners matter for 
FDI promotion.”139 The literature also suggests that while BITs serve as an 
important impetus for domestic institutional change, the most effective 
approach to domestic, FDI-related institutional reform is for MENA states to 
pursue such reforms in addition to pursuing BITs with other countries.140 
 
 133 See id. 
 134 E.g., Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Foreign 
Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788 (2004); Rodolphe Desbordes & Vincent Vicard, Foreign Direct 
Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties: An International Political Perspective, 37 J. COMP. ECON. 372 
(2009). 
 135 See Wasseem Michel Mina, Institutional Reforms Debate and FDI Flows to MENA Region: Does One 
“Best” Fit All? 10–11 (Ga. State Univ. Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 10-34, 
2010). 
 136 Id. at 9. 
 137 E.g., Wasseem Mina, External Commitment Mechanisms, Institutions, and FDI in GCC Countries, 19 
J. INT’L FIN. MARKETS, INSTIUTIONS & MONEY 371, 384 (2009). 
 138 Id. at 12. 
 139 Wasseem Mina, BITs Contracting and FDI Impact in the GCC Countries, ECON. RES. FORUM 20 
(Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/1198317319_BIT_Contracting_FDI_Impact_GCC_ 
Countries_Wasseem_Mina.pdf. 
 140 Mina, supra note 137, at 13–14. 
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As indicated above, the GCC states in general have pursued domestic 
institutional reforms independent of BIT obligations.141 GCC states have 
generally adopted approaches to reform “national rules and bureaucracies” and 
to create FTZs.142 These obligations have been reinforced in GCC BIT 
obligations.143 As of June 2008, the GCC has entered into a total of 105 
BITs.144 
4. Legal Initiatives 
Since the early 2000s, GCC member states have instituted several changes 
to the legal regimes governing FDI. Saudi Arabia, for example, adopted the 
Foreign Investment Law (“FIL”) in 2000, which created the Saudi Arabia 
General Investment Authority (“SAGIA”).145 The FIL provides equal tax 
treatment to foreign and local investors, permits 100% foreign ownership of 
projects, and gives foreign investors access to attractive finance from the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund.146 The FIL also “allows foreign banks to operate 
in the form of locally incorporated joint-stock companies or as branches of 
international financial institutions.”147 Similar provisions can be found in laws 
of Qatar148 and, in the UAE, a proposed Federal Companies Law will allow for 
100% foreign ownership in some sectors outside of the FTZ.149 
 
 141 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 142 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC, supra note 22, at 17. 
 143 See, e.g., Signature of Bilateral Investment Agreement Between Japan and the State of Kuwait, 
MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUSTRY (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2012/0322_03. 
html. 
 144 Mina, supra note 137, at 39. 
 145 See Investment Incentives: Investment Climate in Saudi Arabia, SAUDI ARABIA GEN. INVEST. AUTH., 
http://www.sagia.gov.sa/Investment-climate/Some-Things-You-Need-To-Know-/Investment-Incentives (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 146 Ushering in the New Generation, MEED, Mar. 16, 2001, at 23, 24; accord Jason T. Burdette, Saudi 
Law Launches New Investment Era, US–ARAB TRADELINE, Apr. 21, 2000, at 1, 1. But see Taimur Ahmad, 
Oman Unveils, PROJECT FIN., Dec. 2000, at 24, 27 (noting that in Oman, the permitted level of foreign 
ownership of local companies is sixty-five percent, with the possibility for increases in the future). 
 147 Ali, supra note 122. 
 148 See 2012 Investment Climate Statement—Qatar, U.S. DEP’T STATE (June 2012), http://www.state.gov/ 
e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191221.htm (stating that regulations for foreign and local banks are the same). 
 149 2012 Investment Climate Statement—United Arab Emirates, U.S. DEP’T STATE (June 2012), http:// 
www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191258.htm. (“The proposed law may allow 100 percent foreign 
ownership in some sectors and projects . . . .”). But see id. (“[T]here are four major laws affecting foreign 
investment in the UAE . . . . These laws, especially the Federal Companies Laws, are seen as the largest 
obstacles to foreign direct investment in the UAE.”). 
TOONE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:09 PM 
706 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
GCC governments have also revised their tax codes to facilitate a more 
business-friendly market.150 In addition to FTZs, several GCC states have 
instituted tax codes that are very friendly to multi-national corporations 
(“MNCs”). Kuwait, for example, recently lowered the top marginal tax rate for 
foreign corporations from fifty-five percent to fifteen percent.151 Some GCC 
states also have tax holidays.152 GCC states have also taken steps to reduce 
“bureaucratic red tape,”153 such as expediting the issuance of visas.154 Saudi 
Arabia’s establishment of SAGIA, which functions as a one-stop shop for the 
application and management of FDI projects in Saudi Arabia,155 is perhaps the 
most notable example of reducing administrative and bureaucratic red tape. 
SAGIA has been surprisingly successful in facilitating FDI and managing FDI 
projects.156 GCC states are also increasingly respecting a broad array of private 
property rights, including allowing 100% foreign ownership of residential 
property and other real estate in select areas.157 GCC states have also taken 
steps to eliminate or reduce minimum capital requirements, and have instituted 
creative offset programs designed to encourage FDI.158 
These changes to the legal and institutional environment governing FDI in 
the GCC are reflected in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” 
 
 150 See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 146, at 27; 2012 Investment Climate Statement—Saudi Arabia, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE (June 2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191229.htm. 
 151 Corporate Tax by Country, GLOBAL FIN., http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/economic-
data/11865-corporate-tax-by-country.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
 152 E.g., Oman Highlights 2012, DELOITTE 1, http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Global/Local%20 
Assets/Documents/Tax/Taxation%20and%20Investment%20Guides/2012/dttl_tax_highlight_2012_Oman.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2012); Qatar Highlights 2012, DELOITTE 1, http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
Global/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/Taxation%20and%20Investment%20Guides/2012/dttl_tax_highlight
_2012_Qatar.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 153 Ugo Fasano & Qing Wang, Fiscal Expenditure Policy and Non-Oil Economic Growth: Evidence From 
GCC Countries 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/01/195, 2001), available at http://www.imf. 
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01195.pdf. 
 154 Mohammed Zaher, FDI Inflows to GCC Below Potential Despite Recent Surge, NAT’L BANK OF 
KUWAIT 1, 5 (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.kuwait.nbk.com/InvestmentAndBrokerage/ResearchandReports/ 
$Document/GCCResearchNote/en-gb/MainCopy/$UserFiles/GCCResearchnote20081119%20(1).pdf. 
 155 See What We Do, SAUDI ARABIA GEN. INVEST. AUTH., http://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/SAGIA/What-We-
Do/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012); see also Zaher, supra note 154, at 4–5. 
 156 Khalil Hanware, Saudi Arabia’s Ability To Attract FDI Becomes a Big Success Story, ARABNEWS 
(Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.arabnews.com/node/366416. 
 157 Zaher, supra note 154, at 4. 
 158 Id. at 5. 
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statistics,159 in which GCC member states have consistently improved since 
2006.160 
Overall, GCC governments have instituted several changes to the legal and 
economic structures governing FDI. Legally speaking, the GCC is a much 
more open market than it was only ten or fifteen years ago.161 It is less 
regulated and more business friendly.162 To be sure, several challenges remain. 
Overall, however, the rapid increase in FDI inflows into the GCC can be 
attributed in part to the legal and institutional changes adopted by GCC 
governments during the past fifteen years. 
5. Other 
In addition to the foregoing factors, the GCC states have implemented 
additional reforms that have contributed to the dramatic upsurge in FDI over 
the past decade. To begin with, individual GCC governments have, in general, 
embraced prudent money management policies, and have utilized government 
surpluses wisely.163 Large government surpluses have enabled GCC 
governments to limit debt164 and generate additional revenue, through 
sovereign wealth funds, loans, and foreign investment in other economies.165 
This has not only given GCC states disproportionate influence in international 
money markets, but has contributed to the overall image of a fiscally 
responsible and solvent GCC.166 It has also enabled the GCC to much more 
 
 159 Economy Rankings, DOING BUS.–WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 160 See Distance to Frontier, DOING BUS.–WORLD BANK GROUP http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/ 
distance-to-frontier (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 161 See Zaher, supra note 154, at 4–5. 
 162 See supra Part III.A. 
 163 See Zaher, supra note 154, at 3. The overseas capital resources of the Gulf bourgeoisie are estimated to 
be roughly $800 billion. Steffen Hertog, The GCC and Arab Economic Integration: A New Paradigm, 14 
MIDDLE E. POL’Y 52, 64 (2007). 
 164 WORLD ECON. FORUM, ARAB WORLD COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2011–2012, at 54 fig.8 (2011). 
 165 See GCC in 2020: Outlook for the Gulf and the Global Economy, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 14–
15 (Mar. 2009), http://graphics.eiu.com/marketing/pdf/Gulf2020.pdf. 
 166 Hertog, supra note 26, at 6 (“Total foreign asset holdings held by the Gulf states are estimated at 
amount 1.6 trillion $ [sic]. Compare this with China’s foreign exchange reserves of 1.1 trillion—so far the 
main concern of economists worried about global imbalances. The figures indicate that the Gulf has become 
arguably the most important player on international currency markets, and one of the most important sources 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world economy. Investment decisions made in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi or 
Kuwait City can have a strong influence on the fate of whole currencies and national economies—including 
European ones. Recent concerns about the uncoupling of GCC currencies from the US dollar have highlighted 
the issue.”). 
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effectively reduce oil price fluctuations167—historically the GCC’s Achilles’ 
heel when it came to sustained growth and development.168 
GCC governments have also utilized tax and subsidies effectively,169 
enabling GCC governments to escape the lingering problems facing other 
MENA economies,170 and contributing to per capita incomes that are among 
the highest in the world.171 
The GCC as a whole has also facilitated FDI by promoting the free 
movement of capital and currency conversion with fixed rates.172 Although 
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE have all experienced relatively high inflation rates, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia managed to keep inflation rates below 
seven percent in 2009, with Bahrain experiencing an inflation rate of only 
3.6%.173 The economic turmoil in Dubai in 2008 and 2009 notwithstanding, 
the GCC has enjoyed relatively stable economic growth,174 which has been 
supported by relative political stability,175 although the recent unrest in 
Bahrain176 suggests that the GCC is not immune from the wave of discontent 
that has manifested itself throughout the Middle East over the past two years. 
All indicators, however, point to continued political stability in the GCC 
countries. 
Additionally, the GCC has marketed itself very well. From available 
investment opportunities to cutting-edge financial tools, the GCC has shown 
 
 167 Zaher, supra note 154, at 3. 
 168 FASANO & IQBAL, supra note 108, at 3; see also WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 5, at 
50–51 box II.2. 
 169 See FASANO & IQBAL, supra note 108, at 1; Raphael Espinoza, Government Spending, Subsidies and 
Economic Efficiency in the GCC 2 (OxCarre, Research Paper No. 95, 2012). 
 170 Anthony O’Sullivan et al., Opportunities and Challenges in the MENA Region, ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. 2 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/mena/investment/49036903.pdf. 
 171 The World Factbook: Country Comparison: GDP—Per Capita (PPP), CIA, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
 172 WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 100. 
 173 GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE, supra note 109, at 6. 
 174 Masood Ahmed, GCC: Crisis Highlights Policy Challenges, INT’L ECON. BULL.–CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 18, 2010), http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/03/18/gcc-crisis-
highlights-policy-challenges/3w84#. 
 175 Abdulkhaleq Abdullah Repercussions of the Arab Spring on GCC States, ARAB CENTER RES. & POL’Y 
STUD. 6–7 (May 2012), http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/pdfViewer/5b1fafdb-19d4-4946-a18e-f3115c6fd0 
aa.pdf. 
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the world it is an attractive destination for FDI.177 The GCC’s advanced 
physical infrastructure goes far in conveying to the world the modern amenities 
and opportunities available for foreign investors in the Gulf region.178 
B. Anti-Liberal Trends in GCC FDI Regimes 
The upsurge in FDI in the last decade is due in large part to the liberal 
reforms initiated by GCC member states. GCC states have, however, 
maintained notable levels of regulatory control over strategic aspects of their 
respective FDI regimes.179 Although each state has adopted unique approaches 
to preserving control over various aspects of their FDI regimes, a few 
noteworthy generalizations can be made. 
To begin with, GCC member states have maintained significant levels of 
regulatory control over labor policy. In general, GCC states all embrace labor 
regulations that are very favorable to local employees insofar as they seek to 
encourage all economic enterprises to employ domestic labor and to protect 
domestic employees.180 Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, have 
adopted indigenous worker requirements (officially referred to as “Saudi-
ization” and “Kuwaiti-zation”), which require foreign entities to employ a 
certain percentage of Saudi or Kuwaiti employees among their labor force.181 
In Saudi Arabia, the official requirement is seventy-five percent—that is, 
seventy-five percent of all employees must be Saudi citizens.182 
GCC member states also have very strict requirements for employee 
training, compensation, and termination. Employment is considered a basic 
right in GCC states,183 and laws are designed to ensure that employees are 
protected from circumstances that infringe upon this right or otherwise prevent 
 
 177 See, e.g., Why Invest in Dubai?, GOV’T DUBAI http://www.dha.gov.ae/En/sectorsdirectorates/ 
directorates/healthregulation/healthcareinvestment/pages/whyinvestindubai.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 178 See, e.g., id. 
 179 See generally MENA–OECD Investment Programme Investment Climate and Regulation of 
International Investment in MENA Countries, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2005), http://www.oecd. 
org/mena/investment/36086643.pdf (discussing the investment climate in the MENA region). 
 180 See Nasra M. Shah, RECENT LABOR IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE OIL RICH GULF: HOW EFFECTIVE 
ARE THEY LIKELY TO BE? 9–11 (2008), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/ 
library/download/pub08-12.pdf. 
 181 See id. 
 182 2012 Investment Climate Statement–Saudi Arabia, supra note 150. Based on the author’s personal 
experience, companies only rarely reach forty percent in practice. 
 183 See, e.g., Labor Law, Royal Decree No. 51, 23 Sha’ban 1426 [Sept. 27, 2005] art. 3 (Saudi Arabia), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/74429/81285/F969265747/SAU74429% 
20English.pdf. 
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this right from being fully realized, whether it is through lack of training, 
insufficient compensation, or unlawful termination. Thus, Saudi labor law, for 
example, provides that each employer “prepare his Saudi workers and enhance 
their technical, administrative, vocational and other skills for the purpose of 
gradually replacing non-Saudis.”184 As for compensation, employers may not 
work employees over the maximum statutory limit (no more than eight hours 
per day, or six during Ramadan) without providing overtime pay, which is 
calculated at fifty percent of basic pay.185 Employees all receive paid time off 
for a “weekly rest day,” official holidays, and sick leaves.186 Employees also 
have twenty-one days of prepaid annual leave, thirty if the employee has 
worked for the employer for five or more consecutive years.187 Employees may 
not be required to perform work that is essentially different from the work for 
which they were hired.188 Further, employment contracts renew upon the 
termination date of the contract unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.189 
As for termination, with only few exceptions,190 the employer is severely 
restricted in their ability to terminate an employee.191 Also, Saudi labor law 
provides for an “end of service award,” which is defined as follows: 
Upon the end of the work relation, the employer shall pay the worker 
an end-of-service award of a half-month wage for each of the first 
five years and a one-month wage for each of the following years. The 
end-of-service award shall be calculated on the basis of the last wage 
and the worker shall be entitled to an end-of-service award for the 
portions of the year in proportion to the time spent on the job.192 
The employer must pay an end of service reward tied to length of employment 
even when an employee resigns.193 
Employers also have other wide-ranging responsibilities including: health 
care, schooling requirements, mosque access, protections for women, and 
 
 184 Id. art. 42. 
 185 Id. arts. 98, 107. 
 186 See id. arts. 104(2), 107(3), 117. All hours worked during official holidays are overtime hours. Id. art. 
107(3). 
 187 Id. art. 109(1). 
 188 Id. art. 60. 
 189 Id. art. 55. 
 190 Id. art. 80. 
 191 Id. arts. 74(1), 75, 80, 82. 
 192 Id. art. 84. 
 193 Id. art. 85. 
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literacy programs for employees living away from urban centers.194 Moreover, 
all employment contracts remain in effect in the event of a change in 
ownership, either through sale, merger, partition, or any other restructuring, 
and both the predecessor and successor owners are jointly liable for all wages 
owed to employees prior to the change in ownership.195 Wages owed to 
employees are considered “first-rate privileged debts” in the event of 
bankruptcy or liquidation.196 The high standard of living of domestic workers 
and the dearth of unions add to the GCC member states’ success in maintaining 
regulatory control over labor.197 Overall, considering cheap labor is often a 
catalyst to increased levels of FDI,198 the GCC’s success in attracting FDI is 
notable given its rather strict labor policies. 
In addition to labor law, GCC member states have maintained high levels 
of control over select sectors of their economies, most notably the oil and gas 
sectors. GCC states have enacted advanced regulatory frameworks governing 
the exploration, extraction, and refinement of natural resources, and all 
concession agreements must comply with these regulations.199 Abu Dhabi, for 
example, established the Supreme Petroleum Council (“SPC”), which is: 
[T]he highest authority responsible for the petroleum affairs in the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi, laying down the Emirate’s policy and its 
objectives in all sectors of the petroleum industry, in addition to 
issuing resolutions for implementing its policy, and follow up such 
resolutions until the achievement of the aspired results.200 
The SPC oversees the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and “particularly 
implement[s] Law No. (8) of 1978” relating to the preservation of the oil 
industry.201 
 
 194 Id. art. 146(1)–(6). 
 195 Id. art. 18. 
 196 Id. art. 19. 
 197 See generally Heather E. Murray, Note, Hope for Reform Springs Eternal: How the Sponsorship 
System, Domestic Laws and Tradition Customs Fail to Protect Migrant Domestic Workers in GCC Countries, 
45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 461, 469–70, 472–73 (2012). 
 198 Nauro F. Campos & Yuko Kinoshita, Why Does FDI Go Where It Goes? New Evidence from the 
Transition Economies 9 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/03/228, 2003), available at http:// 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03228.pdf. 
 199 See generally Danyel Reiche, Energy Policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries—
Possibilities and Limitations of Ecological Modernization in Rentier States, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2395, 2402 
(2010) (“GCC countries have recently adopted a more pro-active approach to addressing environmental issues 
on all levels: international, regional, and national.”). 
 200 Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC), ABU DHABI NAT’L OIL COMPANY, http://www.adnoc.ae/Content. 
aspx?newid=24&mid=24 (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 201 Id. 
TOONE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:09 PM 
712 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
Saudi Aramco, the national oil company of Saudi Arabia and one of the 
most valuable companies in the world,202 operates in accordance with Article 
14 of the Saudi Arabia Basic Law of Governance, which states: 
All natural resources that God has deposited underground, above 
ground, in territorial waters or within the land and sea domains under 
the authority of the State, together with revenues of these resources, 
shall be the property of the State, as provided by the Law. 
The Law shall specify means for exploitation, protection and 
development of these resources in the best interest of the State, and 
its security and economy.203 
These examples in Saudi Arabia and the UAE show how GCC countries 
maintain close state-control over their most valuable industries. 
IV.  THE UPSURGE IN FDI AND ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The foregoing analysis outlines the upsurge in FDI in the GCC and the 
legal regime giving rise to this upsurge.204 Although GCC member states have 
adopted FDI regimes rooted in neoliberal economics, they have also 
maintained notable control over important sectors of their FDI regimes, 
including labor policy and the exploitation and management of natural 
resources.205 This control has enabled GCC states to ensure protections for 
GCC nationals and to ensure that state resources are utilized and allocated 
efficiently.206 
The question, however, remains: To what extent has the increase in FDI 
benefited the GCC economies? The assumption, of course, is that increased 
 
 202 Stephen Simpson, Apple, Google and the Six Hundred Dollar Stock Club, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/04/16/apple-google-and-the-six-hundred-dollar-stock-
club/ (“Saudis are famously close-lipped about Aramco, but there have been estimates that the company’s 
value can be measured in the trillions.”); see also At a Glance, SAUDI ARAMCO, http://www.saudiaramco.com/ 
en/home.html#our-company%257C%252Fen%252Fhome%252Four-company%252Fat-a-glance.baseajax. 
html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). Saudi Aramco operates under the direction of the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources. Our Leadership, SAUDI ARAMCO, http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home.html#our-
company%257C%252Fen%252Fhome%252Four-company%252Fleadership.baseajax.html (last visited Oct. 
28, 2012). 
 203 The Basic Law of Government, Royal Decree No. A/90, 27 Sha’ban 1412 [Mar. 1, 1992] art. 14 
(Saudi Arabia), available at http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/laws/The_Basic_Law_ 
Of_Governance.aspx. 
 204 See supra Part III.A.4. 
 205 See id. 
 206 See supra Part III.A. 
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FDI flows bring economic benefits to the host state, and in order to increase 
FDI flows, states must adopt neoliberal FDI regimes based on openness and 
investor-friendly regulations.207 If FDI flows do not bring economic benefits, 
however, then states would likely be less inclined to concede important 
regulatory powers as a way to entice foreign investors. 
Following a brief overview in Part IV.A of the academic debate 
surrounding the relationship between FDI and economic growth, Part IV.B 
presents statistical evidence regarding the degree to which the increased levels 
of FDI have impacted short-term economic growth in the GCC. 
A. The Academic Debate: The Impact of FDI on Economic Growth 
Scholars have long debated the relationship between FDI and economic 
growth, both in general208 and in relation to the Middle East.209 The research 
has intensified during the past decade as a result of increased flows of global 
capital.210 Three general theories have emerged in the literature, each seeking 
to describe the impact that FDI has on economic growth. 
The first theory on foreign investment is the so-called classical theory, 
which states that “foreign investment is wholly beneficial to the host 
economy.”211 Adherents to the classical theory argue that FDI elevates the 
skills and knowledge of the indigenous work force,212 improves management 
skills,213 contributes to capital accumulation,214 fosters economic 
diversification and innovation, reinforces trade policies,215 improves and 
 
 207 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 73, at 48–52.  
 208 E.g., Brian J. Aitken & Ann E. Harrison, Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment? 
Evidence from Venezuela, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 605 (1999); Mona Haddad & Ann Harrison, Are There Positive 
Spillovers from Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence from Panel Data for Morocco, 42 J. DEV. ECON. 51 
(1993); Har Wai Mun et al., FDI and Economic Growth Relationship: An Empirical Study on Malaysia, INT’L 
BUS. RES., Apr. 2008, at 11; Gheorghe Ruxanda & Andreea Muraru, FDI and Economic Growth. Evidence 
From Simultaneous Equation Models, ROMANIAN J. ECON. FORECASTING, no. 1, 2010, at 45. 
 209 See Bassam M. AbuAl-Foul & Mohamed Soliman, Foreign Direct Investment and LDC Exports: 
Evidence from the MENA Region, EMERGING MKTS. FIN. & TRADE, Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 4; Khazri Bilel & 
Djelassi Mouldi, The Relationship Between Financial Liberalization, FDI and Economic Growth: An 
Empirical Test for MENA Countries, ECON. & FIN. REV., DEC. 2011, at 20; Hussein, supra note 10; 
Mohammed Omran & Ali Bolbol, Foreign Direct Investment, Financial Development, and Economic Growth: 
Evidence from the Arab Countries, 1 REV. MIDDLE E. ECON. & FIN. 231 (2003). 
 210 Hussein, supra note 10, at 361. 
 211 SORNARAJAH, supra note 73, at 48. 
 212 Id. 
 213 See MICHAEL P. TODARO & STEPHEN C. SMITH, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 128 (8th ed. 2003). 
 214 Hussein, supra note 10, at 363. 
 215 SONORAJAH, supra note 73, at 48–52. 
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increases access to technology,216 decreases unemployment,217 increases tax 
revenues,218 breaks cycles of underdevelopment,219 and expands production, 
marketing, transport, and communication networks.220 Proponents of the 
classical theory also maintain that FDI fosters the infusion of foreign capital, 
thereby freeing up domestic capital for projects directed toward public 
benefit.221 
The classical theory is rooted in free market economics and its concomitant 
tenets. Following the triumph of capitalism upon the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
facilitated by powerful states and prominent economic institutions such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (also known as the “Washington 
Consensus”), economic liberalism dominated global economic theory in the 
1990s and greatly impacted states’ views towards FDI.222 The classical theory 
continues to shape contemporary views towards FDI,223 although it does have 
its critics. 
The second theory of FDI as it relates to economic growth is the 
“dependency theory,” which is “diametrically opposed to the classical theory, 
and takes the view that foreign investment will not bring about meaningful 
economic development.”224 The central tenets of this theory revolve around the 
fact that most FDI is undertaken on the part of MNCs who, in effect, serve the 
interests of the developed states in which they are headquartered.225 Some 
scholars have stated that repatriation of profits attendant to FDI are greater 
than the actual inflow of FDI.226 Regardless, these scholars argue that the 
resources that do attend FDI by MNCs only benefit the local elite.227 Thus, 
FDI, according to scholars who support the dependence theory, is actually 
 
 216 Eltony, supra note 94, at 92–93. 
 217 See TODARO & SMITH, supra note 213, at 128.  
 218 SORNARAJAH, supra note 73, at 51 (quoting Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a 
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 226 Id. at 49 (citing John R. Oneal & Frances H. Oneal, Hegemony, Imperialism, and the Profitability of 
Foreign Investments, 42 INT’L ORG. 347 (1988)). 
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injurious to the host state insofar as it perpetuates developing states’ 
dependence on developed states.228 
The final theory—the so-called “middle path” theory229—acknowledges, as 
the name implies, both the positive and negative effects that FDI brings to the 
host state.230 This theory was facilitated by the studies of the United Nations 
Commission on Transnational Corporations (“UNCTC”), which demonstrated 
that although “foreign investment through multinational corporations could 
have harmful results in certain circumstances, . . . properly harnessed, 
multinational corporations could be engines that fuel the growth of the 
developing world.”231 In this sense, the objective of the host state is to attract 
FDI while carefully regulating its effects.232 This appears to be the approach 
taken by the GCC during the preceding two decades.233 
In addition to examining various aspects of the relationship between FDI 
and economic growth in other MENA countries,234 scholars have also analyzed 
the impact of FDI on economic growth in the GCC.235 Yet scholars are divided 
over whether and the extent to which FDI affects economic growth in the 
GCC. Some scholars argue that FDI does in fact facilitate economic growth.236 
Other scholars suggest that there is a “weak relationship between FDI and 
GDP” in the GCC.237 Assessing the empirical link between FDI and GDP in 
GCC states is complicated by volatility in the price of oil, upon which GCC 
states heavily rely in their FDI and trade regimes, despite notable efforts to 
reduce this volatility. Moreover, controlling for the effects of fixed capital 
formation and international trade by GCC governments further complicates 
serious analysis. 
Regardless, no study has incorporated the data surrounding the recent 
upsurge in FDI. The recent upsurge in FDI enables scholars to examine the 
post-2000 modifications to GCC FDI regimes and their impact on increased 
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levels of FDI. More importantly, the increase in FDI since 2002 enables 
scholars to more effectively test for the impact of FDI on economic growth. 
The higher the increase in FDI growth, the more likely it is for scholars to 
determine a statistically significant link, if any, between FDI and economic 
growth.238 
B. Statistical Analysis: The Impact of FDI on Short-Term Economic Growth 
The “ambiguous”239 results of scholarly inquiries into the relationship 
between FDI and economic growth in the GCC is attributable, in part, to the 
disparate data samples used by scholars in conducting their analyses and the 
manner in which the same scholars correlate the data to the respective FDI 
regimes being studied.240 Although some scholars have incorporated post-2000 
data on FDI in the GCC into their analyses,241 many have not.242 Regardless, 
unless distinctions are made between data that correlates to, on the one hand, 
pre-2000 FDI regimes and, on the other, post-2000 FDI regimes, then nuanced 
conclusions will remain aloof, especially considering that the coefficients of 
the variables of interest in many studies (GDP, trade openness, fixed capital 
formation, etc.) are highly correlated with the legal structure of the FDI 
regime.243 In other words, studies that utilize post-2000 FDI data will be of 
little consequence unless they also correlate such data to the post-2000 legal 
regimes governing FDI, as all GCC regimes were modified to some degree or 
another after 2000.244 Otherwise, the statistical link or lack thereof between 
FDI and economic growth would be of little importance to both states and 
scholars alike, as the relationship between the FDI regime itself and FDI levels 
would be meaningless. 
The differing conclusions in the literature regarding the relationship 
between FDI and economic growth can also be attributed to the differing 
methodologies utilized by the various scholars. Scholars have relied on such 
empirical tests as the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method,245 heterogeneous 
panel analysis,246 and various cointegration techniques247 to examine the 
 
 238 Bilel & Mouldi, supra note 209, at 25. 
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impact that FDI has on GDP, and vice versa. The different empirical methods 
used by scholars have produced inconsistent results,248 resulting in a lack of 
unanimous support for the proposition that FDI stimulates economic growth. 
The various methodological approaches utilized by scholars are not without 
merit, and differing conclusions can be expected given the sensitive correlation 
between FDI and economic growth. Indeed, even scholars who conclude that 
FDI impacts economic growth acknowledge that the correlation is subtle, with 
large increases in FDI having only small impact on GDP growth.249 Yet, as 
long as methodological differences prevent scholars from coming to uniform 
conclusions about the impact of FDI on economic growth, this important 
question will remain unanswered. For this reason, the dramatic upsurge in FDI 
in the GCC since 2002 is both fortuitous and demanding of critical attention, as 
it enables scholars to examine more definitively the impact that FDI growth 
has on economic growth, in spite of methodological differences. 
Rather than evaluating the correlation between FDI and economic growth 
using a new methodological approach, this study seeks to apply accepted 
statistical analysis methods. While methodology is important, the purpose here 
is to provide the first general analysis of the new data, leaving more nuanced 
analysis to statisticians and economists.250 In addition to basic statistical 
analysis, this study will examine the impact of the upsurge in FDI on economic 
growth in the GCC in light of the conclusions reached by Reyadh Faras and 
Khalifa Ghali, authors of one of the most comprehensive analyses to date on 
the subject of the relation between FDI and economic growth in the GCC.251 
Faras and Ghali utilized a cointegration technique based on the autoregressive 
distributed lag approach (“ARDL”), “which is proven to be more accurate than 
other conventional co-integration techniques, especially when analyzing small 
sample sizes such as is the case for GCC countries.”252 
 
 247 E.g., Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 135. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. at 142–43. 
 250 It is recognized that such an approach suffers from obvious flaws, including the fact that the “studies 
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 251 See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28. 
 252 Id. at 136. 
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Although suffering from many of the same limitations that characterize the 
literature in general,253 Faras and Ghali made significant contributions to the 
literature by analyzing state-specific relationships between FDI and economic 
growth rather than examining the GCC as a whole, concluding that with the 
exception of Kuwait, there existed “a weak but statistically significant causal 
impact of FDI inflows on economic growth.”254 
Part IV.B.1 examines the statistical impact that the increase in FDI had on 
economic growth in the GCC since 2000 in light of the conclusions reached by 
Faras and Ghali. Part IV.B.2 provides some brief observations regarding the 
impact that the increase in FDI in the GCC had on long-term indicators of 
human development. 
1. The Statistical Link Between FDI and Short-Term Economic Growth 
Considering the proximity between the date of this study and the time 
period of the data under evaluation, this study will focus primarily on the 
impact of the increased levels of FDI on short-term, as opposed to long-term, 
growth. “It is common practice in the literature to use the growth rate of real 
GDP as a measure of economic growth,”255 and short-term growth is measured 
by the annual percentage change in real GDP.256 
As indicated above, Faras and Ghali examined the relationship between 
FDI and GDP in each GCC member state. With the exception of Kuwait,257 
they found a short-run equilibrium relationship between the variables for each 
GCC member state, evidenced by the following coefficients: 3.64 for the UAE, 
1.08 for Oman, 1.05 for Saudi Arabia, .97 for Qatar, and .4 for Bahrain.258 A 
coefficient of one implies that an increase in the growth rate of FDI in the short 
run by ten percent causes the RGDP rate to increase by one percent.259 
Averaging the coefficients of each GCC state together (with the exception of 
Kuwait) results in a coefficient of 1.428, suggesting that ten percent growth in 
 
 253 The study only incorporated data up until 2006 and no distinction was made between data taken from 
pre-modification of FDI regimes and post-modification. Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 136–37. 
 254 Id. at 143. 
 255 Id. at 137. 
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 258 Id. at 141–42. 
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FDI in the GCC as a whole should result roughly in a 1.428% increase in the 
GCC’s GDP in the short-term. 












Figure 1 outlines the percentage of FDI growth in the GCC since 2000.261 
The roughly 300% growth in FDI in 2000 should be accompanied by a 42.84% 
growth in the GCC’s combined GDP in the short-run.262 Although the 
definition of “short-run” in the literature is somewhat nebulous, it is often used 
to refer to relatively immediate changes in the domestic economy as a result of 
a rise in aggregate demand.263 
  
 
 260 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 261 See supra Figure 1. 
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Figure 2 juxtaposes the GCC’s actual percentage increases in the GCC’s 
GDP onto the expected GDP growth rates postulated by Faras and Ghali.264 
The expected GDP growth rate is depicted as the rise in GDP during the year 
following the actual percentage rise in FDI (i.e., the 300% increase in FDI 
inflows during 2000 would result in a roughly forty-two percent increase in the 
GCC’s GDP during the following year).265 
Figure 2: Actual Versus Expected (Faras) GDP Percentage Growth in the 












Naturally, the dashed line in Figure 2 mirrors the black line in Figure 1.267 
However, while regression analysis would likely produce more nuanced 
estimations, it is evident from Figure 2 that there is little correlation between 
the GCC’s actual GDP percentage growth and the GDP percentage growth 
expected from the Faras and Ghali analysis, suggesting the statistical 
correlation between the increased levels of FDI and GDP growth from 2000 to 
2010 is weak. 
 
 264 See infra Figure 2. 
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Similar results can be seen when evaluating the actual versus expected 
GDP growth rates in individual GCC member states. Figure 3 illustrates the 
percentage of FDI growth in Saudi Arabia between 2000 and 2010.268 












According to Faras and Ghali, Saudi Arabia has an FDI–GDP coefficient of 
1.05, suggesting that the FDI percentage increase in 2005, for example, of over 
500 percent (indicated in Figure 3) would result in an increase in short-term 
GDP growth of roughly fifty percent.270  
  
 
 268 See infra Figure 3. 
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However, as Figure 4 indicates, at no point between 2000 and 2010 did 
Saudi Arabia experience anything close to a fifty percent increase in GDP 
growth. 
Figure 4: Actual Versus Expected (Faras & Ghali) GDP Percentage Growth 












To be sure, Faras and Ghali do not argue that, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the 
1.05% increase in GDP corresponding to the ten percent increase in FDI flows 
would happen in the same year or the year following the increase in FDI.272 As 
indicated above, the definition of “short-run” in the literature is somewhat 
nebulous.273 However, Figure 4 reveals that besides there being only two years 
where GDP growth surpassed even twenty percent, the statistical correlation 
between the expected GDP growth (according to Faras and Ghali) and the 
actual growth appears minimal.274 
  
 
 271 See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 272 See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28. 
 273 See supra note 263 and the accompanying text. 
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Similar results manifest themselves in the FDI and GDP trends since 2000 
in the UAE, which, as indicated above, has a coefficient of 3.64, implying that 
an increase in the growth rate of FDI in the short run by ten percent causes the 
RGDP rate to increase by 3.64%.275 



















Despite the dramatic percentage increase in FDI in 2002 and 2004, actual 
GDP growth during the same time period was statistically insignificant in 
relation to FDI growth, as indicated by Figure 6.277 
  
 
 275 See infra Figure 5. 
 276 See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
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Figure 6: Actual Versus Expected (Faras & Ghali) GDP Percentage Growth 












Figure 6 reveals that the dramatic percentage increase in FDI in the UAE in 
2003 (4380%) did not result in a concomitant increase in short-term GDP 
percentage growth corresponding to the 3.64 coefficient. 
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Figure 7 presents the same information as Figure 6, absent the dramatic 
expected GDP percentage growth figures of 2003, giving the reader a more 
detailed look at how the UAE’s actual GDP percentage growth corresponded 
to the GDP percentage growth predicted by Faras.  
Figure 7: Actual Versus Expected (Faras & Ghali) GDP Percentage Growth 













Even without the 2003 expected GDP percentage growth figure, data from 
the UAE suggests that Faras and Ghali’s FDI–GDP short-term coefficients are 
not entirely accurate and need to be adjusted to account for the new data 
relating to the upsurge in FDI in the GCC since 2002. Indeed, the updated data 
indicates that the statistical relation between increases in FDI and short-term 
economic growth (as measured by GDP) is weak. 
Overall, the foregoing analysis has relied on statistical analysis and co-
integration techniques (ARDL) employed by Faras and Ghali,280 revealing the 
lack of a clear correspondence between FDI growth and short-term economic 
growth. While constituting only an introductory survey of the new data, the 
 
 279 Id. 
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foregoing analysis supports the work of other scholars who, utilizing different 
methods and incomplete data, have cast doubt over the short-term economic 
benefits that FDI brings to the host state.281 
2. FDI, Long-Term Growth, and Other Economic Development Indicators 
While the data attendant to the post-2002 increase in FDI does not lend 
itself to nuanced assessments of the long-term implications of the new FDI 
regimes in the Gulf and the increased FDI inflows those regimes have 
generated, scholars can nonetheless integrate the new data into the existing 
data from the past thirty years in order to draw preliminary conclusions. 
Although, as indicated above, scholars should be wary of drawing conclusions 
from the data when the pre-2000 data is associated with entirely different FDI 
regimes,282 the following analysis briefly examines the integrity of Faras and 
Ghali’s FDI–GDP long-term coefficients in light of the new data. 
 
 281 See, e.g., Jallab et al., supra note 10, at 13. 
 282 Id.; see Faras & Ghali, supra note 28. 
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According to the Faras and Ghali analysis, the average long-run coefficient 
for GCC member states is .365, suggesting that an increase in FDI by ten 
percent leads to long-term GDP increases of 3.65%.283 Figure 8 outlines the 
long-term FDI percentage increases in the GCC since 1980. 





 283 See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 141 tbl.6. 
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Figure 9 suggests that the correlation between actual GDP percentage 
growth in the GCC since 1980 and that expected from the Faras and Ghali 
analysis remains weak.  
Figure 9: Actual Versus Expected (Faras & Ghali) GDP Percentage Growth 
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Figure 10 illustrates the long-term growth in GDP and FDI in absolute 
dollar figures. 
Figure 10: Long-term Growth of GCC FDI (in millions) and GDP (in 












Although a more accurate determination would be gained through regression 
analysis of the variables, it appears from Figure 10 that there is a statistically 
significant correlation between FDI and GDP long-term growth.287 
This long-term correlation is supported by alternative indicators of 
economic development, including the Human Development Index (“HDI”).288 
“The HDI represents a push for a broader definition of well-being and provides 
a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, 
education and income.”289 The HDI incorporates the following indicators of 
human and economic development: life expectancy at birth, expected and 
mean years of schooling, Gross National Income per capita in purchasing 
 
 286 See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2. 
 287 See supra Figure 10. 
 288 See Human Development Index (HDI), U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
 289 See United Arab Emirates–Country Profile: Human Development Indicators, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 
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power parity terms, multidimensional poverty index, gender equality index, 
and adjusted net savings.290 According to the U.N. Development Programme, 
the UAE experienced a noticeable improvement in its HDI score around 2002, 
suggesting a preliminary correlation between increases in FDI and economic 
development.291 Saudi Arabia’s HDI growth rate, however, retained its 
historical trajectory from 2000 to 2010, despite the increase in FDI inflows 
during this same period.292 
The available data suggests more of a statistical correlation between FDI 
levels and long-term economic growth than between FDI and short-term 
economic growth. However, more research needs to be done to more 
effectively incorporate the post-2002 FDI data from the GCC into the 
statistical analyses surrounding the impact of FDI on economic growth. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis of the upsurge in FDI in the GCC and the legal 
regimes giving rise to this upsurge is a modest attempt to evaluate the impact 
of increased FDI levels on economic growth in the GCC. The data suggests 
that among the primary factors contributing to the upsurge in FDI in the GCC 
was the liberal FDI policies adopted by GCC member states. Although the rise 
in the price of crude oil and the global expansion in FDI flows prior to 2008 
also likely contributed to the rise in FDI,293 the inflows in FDI into the GCC—
even during the global recession—were facilitated by open FDI regimes 
instituted by GCC member states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. More 
importantly, the foregoing analysis reveals that GCC member states 
successfully promoted open FDI regimes while simultaneously maintaining 
regulatory control over strategic economic sectors, particularly in the areas of 
labor regulation and resource management. In this sense, GCC member states’ 
recent FDI success is remarkable not merely because of the degree to which 
FDI increased, but because GCC states fostered increased FDI levels while 
maintaining a notable amount of sovereign control over important aspects of 
the FDI regime. 
 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Compare id., with Human Development Report 2011: Saudi Arabia, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/SAU.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). 
 293 See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
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The decrease in FDI since 2010 reinforces the tenuous relationship between 
neoliberal FDI regimes and increased FDI levels. Moreover, the foregoing 
analysis suggests that even dramatically high increases in FDI do not 
necessarily have a statistically significant correlation to short-term economic 
growth. The available data suggests a more definitive statistical correlation 
between FDI and long-term economic growth, although more statistical 
research needs to be done to more effectively incorporate the data from the 
post-2002 upsurge and post-2010 decline in FDI into the academic debate. 
This Article has sought to incorporate data from 2002 to 2010 into the 
literature and to make some preliminary observations regarding the statistical 
relation between FDI and economic growth in light of the new data. 
For states—particularly resource-rich, Middle Eastern states such as 
Libya—seeking to foster long-term development and more effectively 
integrate into the global economy, the results of the foregoing analysis should 
be instructive. After all, the GCC is considered the “anchor of stability” in the 
MENA region, and its reforms are often a harbinger for regional economic 
development.294 No longer do the tenets of classical economic thought find 
uniform support in the literature.295 If anything, the upsurge in FDI since 2002 
in the GCC underscores the fact that resource-rich states can develop 
successful FDI regimes without abdicating regulatory control over aspects 
central to national interests. 
It is not inaccurate to label some of the central tenets of the classical theory 
of economic growth as seductive mirages, at least as they apply in a GCC 
context. That is, no longer can it be assumed that successful FDI regimes 
depend upon open, unregulated, and investor-friendly laws. The GCC 
experience since 2000 demonstrates that while liberal policies are no doubt 
essential to the promotion of FDI, they can be supplemented with strategic 
regulatory controls that protect local investors and ensure long-term economic 
stability. The data available from the post-2002 upsurge in FDI also suggests 
that it would be ill-advised for resource-rich, Middle Eastern states to assume 
that high levels of FDI will translate ipso facto into increased economic 
growth, at least in the short term. 
 
 
 294 Hertog, supra note 163, at 67. 
 295 See supra Part I. 
